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WHERE ARE MY CHILDREN . . . AND MY
RIGHTS? PARENTAL RIGHTS TERMINATION
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DEPORTATION
C. ELIZABETH HALL†
ABSTRACT
The U.S. Supreme Court has set out a constitutional framework
under which termination-of-parental-rights cases must be adjudicated
in state courts. In all cases, this framework requires proof of parental
unfitness by clear and convincing evidence before parental rights can
be terminated, even when the parents in question are illegal
immigrants. Despite this framework, in a rash of recently published
cases, courts have terminated the parental rights of illegal immigrant
parents without regard for these requirements. Those who work
closely with immigrants fear that the published instances are merely
the tip of the iceberg.
This Note aims to shed light on this problem by discussing
instances of such termination and identifying reasons that may have
led courts to terminate parental rights outside of the constitutional
framework. After identifying two primary reasons—cultural bias
against immigrants and prison conditions that render maintaining
parent-child relationships difficult—this Note suggests possible
legislative changes that may decrease the number of such
terminations.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 22, 2007, Encarnación Bail Romero, an illegal
immigrant, was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) custody during a raid on a Carthage, Missouri poultry
1
processing plant where she worked. Her son, Carlos, was ultimately
placed in the custody of an American couple who petitioned for the
termination of Ms. Bail’s parental rights so that they could adopt
2
Carlos. The petition was filed on October 5, 2007, less than five
months after Ms. Bail was taken into custody; the petition was served
3
on Ms. Bail on October 16, two days before the termination hearing.
4
Two DLA Piper attorneys took on Ms. Bail’s case, which
5
subsequently attained a significantly heightened public profile.
Consequently, commentators and legal scholars began to take note of
what some fear is a widespread problem in the United States—the
termination of illegal immigrants’ parental rights as a result of the
6
initiation of deportation proceedings against them.
For now, Ms. Bail’s custody battle has a potentially encouraging
outcome: on January 25, 2011, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed
the appellate court’s decision and remanded the case for a new trial
7
on all claims. Every supreme court judge agreed that the trial court

1. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SC 91141, slip op. at 3 (Mo. Jan.
25, 2011) (en banc), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=43941.
2. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *2
(Mo. Ct. App. July 21, 2010); see also Ginger Thompson, After Losing Freedom, Some
Immigrants Face Loss of Custody of Their Children, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at A15
(discussing details of Ms. Bail’s case). For more on Ms. Bail’s case, see infra notes 85–94 and
accompanying text.
3. S.M., slip. op. at 5.
4. Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination 26 n.129 (July 26, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1648999.
5. Ms. Bail has told her story to at least one congressional committee. See Emily Butera,
Are Children of Immigrants Becoming Needless Statistics in the Child Welfare System?,
RESTORE FAIRNESS (Nov. 16, 2009), http://restorefairness.org/2009/11/are-children-ofimmigrants-becoming-needless-statistics-in-the-child-welfare-system (“When Encarnación told
her story during a briefing in the House of Representatives last week you could have heard a
pin drop.”). At the time of her testimony, Ms. Bail was awaiting deportation from the United
States. See id. (noting that, as of November 2009, Ms. Bail was “scheduled for deportation to
Guatemala in February [2010]”).
6. See infra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
7. S.M., slip op. at 45–46.
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8

had “plainly erred.” The supreme court split 4–3, however, on the
appropriate remedy. The dissenters argued that, based on the
admitted miscarriage of justice, Ms. Bail should be given custody of
9
10
her son immediately. The majority remanded for a new trial instead,
despite its agreement that the case was “a travesty in its egregious
procedural errors, its long duration, and its impact on Mother,
11
Adoptive Parents, and, most importantly, Child.” The remand
means that, even with a favorable outcome at the trial level, much
12
more time will pass before Ms. Bail and Carlos reunite.
It is difficult to determine exactly how many illegal immigrant
parents have found themselves in Ms. Bail’s situation. And in many
other cases, second chances at review—such as Ms. Bail will receive—
are not forthcoming. As recently as 2009, the Virginia Court of
Appeals affirmed the termination of an illegal immigrant father’s
parental rights, in part because his deportation prevented him from
13
maintaining contact with his children. Similarly, in 2005, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld the termination of the parental
rights of a Nigerian illegal immigrant after she was taken into
14
deportation proceedings.
At least two other cases have dealt with termination of parental
rights as a result of entering deportation proceedings, both with
15
results favorable to the immigrant parents. Despite the relatively
8. Id., slip op. at 45; see also id., slip op. at 46 n.25 (describing points of agreement and
disagreement among the judges).
9. See id., slip op. at 46 n.25 (“The dissenting members believe passionately that custody
of Child should be returned to Mother without further proceedings. That result can be reached
only by disregarding the law.”).
10. Id., slip op. at 45–46.
11. Id., slip op. at 46 n.25.
12. See Missouri Ruling Extends Legal Battle for Immigrant’s Son, CNN (Jan. 26, 2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-26/us/missouri.immigrant.child_1_parental-rights-adoptiveparents-maternal-rights?_s=PM:US (“[M]any more months are likely to pass before it’s known
who will have custody of [the] 4-year-old boy . . . .”).
13. Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4, 2009 WL
1851017, at *2, *4 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009). For discussion of another situation in which
deportation made it difficult for an immigrant parent to meet the requirements necessary to
regain custody of her children, see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
14. State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL
975339, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005).
15. See State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 96 (Neb. 2009)
(overturning the lower court’s termination of an illegal immigrant mother’s parental rights after
she was taken into deportation proceedings); Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim,
No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 1847638, at *4 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (affirming the lower court’s
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small number of cases that have come before appellate courts and the
relatively high percentage of those cases that have had parentfriendly outcomes, there is reason to suspect that parent-friendly
outcomes are the exception, not the rule. Professor Marcia YablonZug has noted that although decisions to terminate illegal
immigrants’ parental rights are “frequently reversed” on appeal, the
parents often do not appeal, either because they are too poor or
because they have already been deported and are unable to access the
16
U.S. legal system. In addition, access to information about these
17
cases is scarce because records are sealed in most cases.
Reports from staffers of legal organizations confirm that this
problem is serious and far-reaching. Based on information from its
immigrant clients, the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee
Rights has observed the growing “practice of stripping away
immigrants’ parental rights . . . on the basis of their immigration
status, often in the quartet of courts, immigration, local law
18
enforcement and foster care agencies.” Similarly, Legal Momentum,
another nonprofit that provides legal services to immigrants, has
commented,
The separation of U.S. citizen children and immigrant parents due to
immigration raids and detentions has emerged as a nation-wide
issue. . . . A pattern is emerging in which some state departments of
social services are taking U.S. born children from undocumented
immigrant parents and placing them in foster care, in violation of the
undocumented immigrant [parents’] right to custody of their
19
children.

refusal to terminate an illegal immigrant father’s parental rights after he was deported).
16. Yablon-Zug, supra note 4, at 26 & n.129.
17. Id. at 26 n.129; see also Butera, supra note 5 (“Because it is difficult to gather accurate
data about the undocumented population it is impossible to know how many children have
already been affected.”).
18. Human Rights Abuses Against Immigrant Parents, NAT’L NETWORK FOR IMMIGRANT
& REFUGEE RTS., http://org2.democracyinaction.org/o/5702/t/4329/content.jsp?content_KEY
=1766 (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
19. Immigration Raids Separate Children from Parents, LEGAL MOMENTUM, http://www.
legalmomentum.org/our-work/immigrant-women-program/immigration-raids-separate.html
(last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
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Further, a number of people who work closely with illegal immigrants
have recounted first-hand stories that indicate the increasing
20
frequency of situations like Ms. Bail’s.
This Note traces the problem of termination due to deportation
through recent cases and suggests legislative changes that would
decrease the number of illegal immigrants who lose their children
because of the commencement of deportation proceedings. Part I
discusses the constitutional background that governs termination of
parental rights for all parents, including illegal immigrant parents.
Despite their constitutional right to raise their children absent proof
21
of parental unfitness, these individuals are losing parental rights as a
consequence of their detainment for immigration violations, and
22
without adequate determinations that they are unfit parents. Part II
discusses how, within the boundaries of that constitutional
framework, state and federal laws normally operate to terminate
parental rights. Part III argues that trial judges have departed from
the proper application of the constitutional procedures in the few
reported termination cases involving illegal immigrants. That Part
goes on to identify two problems—cultural bias and prison-life
constraints—that cause courts to misapply the law, and it explains
how state and federal laws exacerbate the problem. Part IV then
discusses three potential solutions—at the state, federal, and
international levels—that together address both cultural bias and
prison-life issues. Implementation of any number of these solutions
may begin to remedy a problem that those closest to it believe to be
widespread.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PARENTS
Family law issues are indisputably the province of state law and
23
state courts. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has found that the
20. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 2 (“In visits to detention centers across the country,
Ms. Schriro [an adviser to the Homeland Security Secretary] said, she has heard accounts of
parents losing contact or custody of their children.”); id. (“[L]awyers and advocates for
immigrants say that cases like [Ms. Bail’s] are popping up across the country as crackdowns
against illegal immigrants thrust local courts into transnational custody battles and leave
thousands of children in limbo.”); Butera, supra note 5 (“[M]y inbox has been flooded with
stories such as Encarnación Bail Romero’s.”).
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (“[T]he whole subject of the domestic
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Constitution restricts states’ authority to interfere with family
24
decisions and rights. The Court has repeatedly placed great
emphasis on the right of natural parents to the “companionship, care,
25
custody, and management of [their] children.” The right has been
26
deemed “far more precious than any property right” and one that
“undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
27
countervailing interest, protection.” Indeed, the Court considers this
28
interest fundamental, protected by the Equal Protection and Due
29
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Termination of parental rights is perhaps the greatest
interference that the state can impose on the fundamental right of
parents to raise their children and is consequently approached with
great skepticism by the Supreme Court. As the Court has noted,
“When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it
seeks not merely to infringe [on a] fundamental liberty interest, but to
30
end it.” Consequently, the termination of parental rights “‘must be
accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due
31
Process Clause.’”
To avoid undue deprivations of parental rights, the Supreme
Court has put into place procedural safeguards designed to protect
the fundamental liberty interests of the parent. As a whole, the
procedural safeguards as set out by the Supreme Court require
several steps. First, the parent is entitled to a hearing, which takes

relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the
laws of the United States.” (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890))).
24. See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (addressing
whether grandparents may be given visitation rights against the wishes of the child’s parents);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (addressing the evidentiary standard required to prove
unfitness before parental rights may be terminated); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18
(1981) (addressing whether indigent parents must be provided an attorney in termination-ofparental-rights proceedings); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (addressing whether
unfitness must be proven before parental rights may be terminated).
25. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
26. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758–59.
27. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651).
28. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759; see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66 (plurality opinion) (“In
light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of their children.”).
29. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
30. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
31. Id. at 753 (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
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place in state court, to determine whether she is a fit parent. At this
hearing, “[statutory] allegations of abuse or neglect are presented to
the court, which must determine whether there is a sufficient factual
33
and legal basis for state intervention.” A parent’s rights can be
34
terminated only if she is found to be unfit. A finding of unfitness
requires a clear statutory basis and clear and convincing evidence that
35
the facts of the case support that finding under the statute. Then—
and only then—may the court go on to consider the best interests of
36
the child. Only if the court finds that the parent is unfit and that
termination would be in the child’s best interests may the parent’s
rights be terminated.
These procedural safeguards are guaranteed by the Fourteenth
37
Amendment—as specified in Stanley v. Illinois and Santosky v.
38
Kramer —and thus they apply not only to U.S. citizens but also to
illegal immigrant parents. In one of its earliest discrimination cases,
the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections, which
39
are granted to “any person within [a state’s] jurisdiction,” are “not
40
41
confined to the protection of citizens.” Later, in Plyler v. Doe, the
32. In its earliest case addressing the termination of parental rights, the Court determined
that “all . . . parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their
children are removed from their custody.” Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
33. HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & ANN LAQUER ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES AND
PROBLEMS 561 (7th ed. 2005).
34. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
35. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the Supreme Court held that “the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands . . . [that] [b]efore a State may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child . . . the State [must]
support its allegations [of parental unfitness] by at least clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at
747–48.
36. See id. at 760 (suggesting that until the unfitness of a parent is proven, the parent and
the child have the same best interests, by stating, “until the State proves parental unfitness, the
child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural
relationship”); CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 33, at 571 (“[T]ermination of parental rights must be
premised on parental unfitness rather than a determination of the child’s best interests . . . .”);
see also JOHN DEWITT GREGORY, PETER N. SWISHER & SHERYL L. WOLF, UNDERSTANDING
FAMILY LAW 191 (3d ed. 2005) (“[I]t is only after a determination of parental unfitness that the
best interests of the child will outweigh other considerations in a proceeding for termination of
parental rights.”).
37. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
38. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
40. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 781 (2008) (assuming that aliens have due process rights in determining that they are
entitled to habeas corpus); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that
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Court went on to explain that “[w]hatever his status under the
immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of
that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is
unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due
42
process of law by the . . . Fourteenth Amendment[].” The Court has
given no indication that parental rights of immigrants should be
43
treated as an exception to these principles. Indeed, even some courts
that have deprived illegal immigrants of their parental rights through
“all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed
by [the Fifth and Sixth Amendments], and that even aliens shall not . . . be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law”).
41. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
42. Id. at 210 (emphasis added).
43. See S. Adam Ferguson, Note, Not Without My Daughter: Deportation and the
Termination of Parental Rights, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85, 92 (2007) (“[T]he fundamental right to
raise children [is not limited] to U.S. citizens only.”); see also Yablon-Zug, supra note 4, at 10–11
(“The constitutional rights of parents are not confined to citizens. Immigrant parents also have
the right to the care and custody of their children.” (footnote omitted)). Because of the
importance of the parental rights held by illegal immigrants, if, by following the procedures set
out by the Supreme Court, an illegal immigrant parent is found to be fit, and thus retains
custody of her child, the parent has the right to take the child to the parent’s country of origin
when the parent is deported. This is the case even if the child is a U.S. citizen. See David B.
Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165,
1189–97 (2006) (discussing cases that hold that parents may take their U.S. citizen children with
them when they are deported from the United States). Numerous circuits have held that no
constitutional rights of citizen children are violated when their parents are deported, even if that
deportation results in the child’s exit from the United States. See, e.g., Garcia v. Holder, 320 F.
App’x 288, 290–91 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Though [the alien’s] minor daughter is a United States
citizen, her constitutional rights are not affected by the deportation of [her] parent, even where
her de facto deportation will result.” (citing Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir.
1969))); Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 512 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007) (“While . . . U.S. citizen
children . . . may be forced to accompany their parents to the country of removal, we and our
sister circuits have held that this . . . is countenanced by the INA and not violative of the
children’s constitutional rights.”); see also Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine
After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 708 (2005) (noting that “[v]irtually all the U.S.
circuit courts have denied that any constitutional right of a citizen . . . is violated or even
implicated when the citizen’s noncitizen family members are excluded from the United States or
not allowed to remain here”). The deportation of an illegal immigrant parent and the parent’s
removal of the citizen child “merely postpone[s]” the child’s right to live in the United States
until the child is old enough to exercise that right; it does not end the right entirely. Thronson,
supra, at 1194 (quoting Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1158 (3d Cir. 1977)); see also AyalaFlores v. INS, 662 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that the child in question would be able
to decide to return to the United States and exercise her citizenship rights when she “reach[ed]
the age of discretion” and that her rights would not be permanently barred because of her
parents’ decision to take her to Mexico with them when they were deported). Finally, though
the Supreme Court has not addressed this specific issue, it has noted that citizens may be
“compelled by family . . . reasons” to “reside abroad indefinitely” and that doing so will not
cause the citizen to “suffer[] loss of citizenship.” Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1964).
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termination have implicitly acknowledged that those protections
apply by citing them as the framework within which the courts’
44
decisions must be made.
II. APPLYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: STATE AND
FEDERAL LAWS
Against this constitutional background, state and federal laws
determine when termination proceedings should be initiated against a
parent, and state laws determine what qualifies as unfitness in those
proceedings. Although the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding
the termination of parental rights provides the framework for
handling such cases, it is up to the states to develop laws that dictate
the actual termination of rights. These laws, designed with the best of
intentions, have proven to be an enormous hurdle to some illegal
immigrant parents who attempt to defend their parental rights from
within the confines of deportation-related proceedings. Through a
45
federal funds law, the federal government also plays a role in
determining when termination proceedings will be initiated against a
parent. An understanding of how these rules operate within the
constitutional framework is necessary to understand the problems
facing immigrant parents in some courts.
A. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
46

The federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)
was adopted to “achieve permanence for children in the foster care
47
48
system.” The ASFA is a federal funds act, so states receiving
44. See, e.g., State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT,
2005 WL 975339, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005) (stating that “[a] court may terminate a
parent’s parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that one of the statutory
grounds for termination of parental rights has been established and that the termination of such
rights is in the best interests of the child” and citing Stanley v. Illinois as governing law).
45. A federal funds act is one that “[c]ondition[s] federal funding upon state performance
of a particular function.” MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32390,
VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS: OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION AND
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) INTERPRETATION OF CONSULAR NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS 21 (2004); see also infra note 251 and accompanying text.
46. ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
47. Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2001).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 670 (2006) (“The sums made available under this section shall be used for
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federal funds for foster care maintenance payments or adoption
49
incentives are obliged to abide by its requirements. Of greatest
relevance here, the ASFA requires states to initiate termination
proceedings against parents if their children have been in foster care
50
for fifteen of the preceding twenty-two months. There are three
51
narrow exceptions, including if the child is being cared for by a
52
relative under state supervision. Because the average sentence for an
inmate exceeds fifteen months, these guidelines affect a considerable
number of parents whose children must go into foster care during
53
their incarceration.
making payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, State
plans under this part.”).
49. The ASFA falls under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. This Title provides states
with “such sums [of federal funds] as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this part.”
Id. The provisions of the part are designed to “enabl[e] each State to provide . . . foster care and
transitional independent living programs for [certain] children . . . and adoption assistance for
children with special needs.” Id.
50. Id. § 675(5)(E) (“[I]n the case of a child who has been in foster care under the
responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months . . . the State shall file a petition to
terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Jade S.
Laughlin, Bruce A. Arrigo, Kristie R. Blevins & Charisse T.M. Coston, Incarcerated Mothers
and Child Visitation: A Law, Social Science, and Policy Perspective, 19 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV.
215, 222 (2008) (“ASFA stipulates that when a child has been in the system for 15 months,
parental rights can be terminated, making the child eligible for adoption. For criminally
confined mothers who function as the primary care providers, this legislation poses a
considerable threat to their children and to the family unit.”).
51. The three exceptions are that the child is being cared for by a relative, that the state
agency has documented a compelling reason that filing such a petition is not in the best interests
of the child, or that the state agency has not provided reasonable, required services to the family
of the child. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
52. Id. (“[I]n the case of a child who has been in foster care . . . for 15 of the most recent 22
months . . . the State shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s
parents . . . unless at the option of the State, the child is being cared for by a relative.” (emphasis
added)). Many state versions of the Act have similar provisions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15317(1)(b), (2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (adopting language similar to the ASFA); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-525.1(b)(1)(i), .1(b)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2006) (same); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-3-431(m)(i) (2009) (same). Unfortunately, many illegal immigrant parents have difficulty
finding a relative to care for their children while they are incarcerated. Additionally, if the only
relatives available in the United States are illegal, it is unlikely that the state would sanction the
child’s placement with those relatives to meet the statutory requirement, and the relatives may
fear deportation if they do choose to provide care for the children of the incarcerated
immigrant. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 2 (noting that Ms. Bail’s son was initially sent to live
with two aunts but was later put into foster care when “[t]he women—each with three children
of their own, no legal status, tiny apartments and little money” could no longer care for Carlos).
Non-state-supervised care provided by a relative, such as non-state-sanctioned care by a relative
illegally present in the United States, would not be sufficient to meet this exception.
53. See JEREMY TRAVIS, ELIZABETH CINCOTTA MCBRIDE & AMY SOLOMON, FAMILIES
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In general, if a child has been in foster care for fifteen of the
previous twenty-two months and does not qualify for any of the
exceptions, a state will initiate proceedings against the child’s parents
as required by the ASFA. At that time, the parent’s constitutional
rights require that she be given a hearing on her fitness. If it is proven
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit, the court
then asks whether termination is in the best interests of the child. If it
54
is, the parent’s rights are terminated.
What the ASFA does not do is establish that the parent has been
unfit by virtue of leaving her child in foster care for the statutory
period. On its face, the language of the statute merely requires that
55
the state “file a petition to terminate the parental rights.” This
56
phrasing, as well as its implementation by the courts, suggests that a
child’s placement in foster care for the statutory period is only the
beginning of the process of terminating parental rights. The
remainder of the process must still be carried out under the ordinary
57
constitutional procedures. Indeed, at least one court has explicitly
LEFT BEHIND: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 1, 6 (rev. 2005),
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310882_families_left_behind.pdf (“Because
women serve an average of 18 months in prison, many female inmates whose children are in
nonrelative foster care may face the possibility of losing their parental rights.”); Creasie Finney
Hairston, Prisoners and Families: Parenting Issues During Incarceration 7 (Dec. 2001)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/prison2home02/hairston.pdf
(“The average prison stay is longer than the period in which termination procedures are
required to begin . . . .”).
54. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text; see also CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 33,
at 562 (noting that the ASFA must be “interpret[ed] and appl[ied]” in accordance with the
constitutional procedures set out by the Supreme Court).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E).
56. An example is a 2001 challenge to an Illinois statute that allowed a child’s presence in
foster care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months to be the basis for an unfitness
determination. In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864, 866–67 (Ill. 2001). The statute was challenged on
constitutional grounds. Id. at 868. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the presumption of
unfitness created by the mere fact of a child being in foster care for fifteen out of the previous
twenty-two months was unconstitutional because it
is not narrowly tailored to the compelling goal of identifying unfit parents because it
fails to account for the fact that, in many cases, the length of a child’s stay in foster
care has nothing to do with the parent’s ability or inability to safely care for the child
but, instead, is due to circumstances beyond the parent’s control.
Id. at 872. In so holding, the court required that unfitness be shown apart from the statutory
timeframe requirements. Id.
57. Professors Homer Clark, Jr., and Ann Estin agree, stating, “Courts must interpret and
apply the requirements of th[is] statute[] against a background of constitutional protections for
parental rights.” CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 33, at 562; see also State v. Maria L. (In re Interest
of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 92 (Neb. 2009) (“Regardless of the length of time a child is
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held that “the fact that a child has been placed outside the home for
15 or more of the most recent 22 months does not demonstrate
parental unfitness” but instead “provides a guideline for what would
be a reasonable time for parents to rehabilitate themselves to a
58
minimum level of fitness.” Some state courts, however, have
erroneously assumed that a child’s placement in foster care for fifteen
of the previous twenty-two months is dispositive of unfitness, allowing
the ASFA to play a substantive, rather than a procedural, role in the
59
termination process.
B. State Laws
Beyond their application of the ASFA, state courts play another
major role in termination proceedings. Family law issues are the
60
province of state courts. Accordingly, it is state law that defines
parental unfitness for termination purposes. States have varying rules
on what constitutes unfitness, but there are several basic actions that
61
virtually always constitute unfitness. The most relevant bases for the
purposes of this Note are abandonment, including failure to support
or maintain contact with the child, failure to remedy a persistent
condition that caused the removal of the child, and failure to comply
62
with a reunification or rehabilitation plan.

placed outside the home, it is always the State’s burden to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent is unfit . . . .”).
58. Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 92.
59. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 23.
61. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 2–3 (2010),
available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf;
see also GREGORY ET AL., supra note 36, at 184 (“Typical statutory grounds for termination of
parental rights include abandonment, child abuse, neglect or dependency, [and] nonsupport . . . .”). Failure to remedy a persistent condition that caused the child to be placed in
foster care is another cause for termination of parental rights in many states. E.g., State Dep’t of
Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 975339, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Apr. 26, 2005); Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4,
2009 WL 1851017, at *2 n.2 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1283(C)(1) (2006)); Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL
1847638, at *2–3 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000).
62. E.g., S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SC91141, slip op. at 1 (Mo.
Jan. 25, 2011) (en banc), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=43941; Maria L., 767
N.W.2d at 84; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2 & n.1.
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Abandonment typically includes a “failure to communicate with
the child for a specified period of time, failure to provide support, or
other evidence of an intent to relinquish parental claims to the
63
child.” Some states require that, to support a finding of unfitness, the
failure to communicate or other acts of abandonment must be
64
willful. Others require that the actions purported to constitute
abandonment, including failure to maintain contact, must have been
65
within the parent’s control.
Abandonment may also be defined to encompass other bases for
a finding of unfitness, such as failure to support or maintain contact
with the child. Failure to provide support, whether as a stand-alone
requirement or as a factor showing abandonment, is typically
demonstrated when the parent, for a particular period of time, has
66
“‘failed significantly without justifiable cause to provide support.’”
Another common statutory basis for finding unfitness in these
immigrant cases is failure to remedy the persistent condition that led
to the removal of the child. This failure is generally established by a
showing that the circumstances that led to the child’s removal have
67
not changed and are not likely to change in the near future. It
appears that it is unnecessary for the conditions to be completely
remedied by the time of the termination hearing, so long as they will
68
be remedied reasonably soon after the proceedings.
Failure to comply with a reunification or rehabilitation plan can
also be sufficient grounds for termination of parental rights. In
general, the failure to comply must be substantial or material to the
69
overall goal of providing a fit life for the child. Before terminating
63. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 36, at 186.
64. See CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 33, at 580 (noting that some courts have found that
“acts of abandonment must be willful”).
65. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 36, at 187 (“Lack of parental contact might not
constitute abandonment if its cause is not within the parent’s control.”).
66. Id. at 189 (quoting In re J.J.J., 718 P.2d 948, 949 (Alaska 1986)). Support includes food,
clothing, shelter, and education expenses, as well as other care necessary for the child’s
development. Id. at 188–89 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221(1)(b)(2) (West 1992) (current
version at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301(1)(b)(2) (West 2007))).
67. E.g., In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (terminating parental
rights where the mother was unable to show that she would “be able at any time in the
foreseeable future to provide . . . the financial support [and the structured living environment]
that the children need”).
68. See id. at 657–58 (noting that there was “very little likelihood that the[] conditions
would be remedied at an early date” or in the “foreseeable future”).
69. Failure to comply with parts of the plan that are not material to this end will generally
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parental rights on this basis, the state generally must take reasonable
70
steps to assist the parent in complying with the plan, and the plan
71
must be one with which the parent is able to comply.
III. SETTLED LAW, UNSETTLING OUTCOMES
What is disconcerting about the cases addressing termination of
illegal immigrants’ parental rights after deportation proceedings
begin is the lack of strict adherence to the constitutional requirement
that a parent be found unfit based on state statutory definitions. The
cases, even those that do adhere to well-established constitutional
principles, reveal two important factors that have allowed courts to
terminate parental rights without a showing of unfitness. First, each
court to address these matters has either displayed or noted a
“culture clash” that resulted in passing over the question of parental
fitness and moving directly to a best-interests analysis. That analysis
easily devolves into a determination that “one environment or set of
72
circumstances is superior to another.”
Second, the daily struggles that incarcerated parents face in
maintaining sufficient contact with their children make it easier for
courts to find the parents unfit, despite the efforts of the parents to
contact their children and the system’s failure to aid them in doing
73
so. This is exacerbated by the particular situation of immigrant
detainees—incarceration far from the foster homes of their children

not suffice for termination. See, e.g., 25 FLA. JUR. 2D Family Law § 292 (2010) (“The court must
advise the parents that, if they fail to substantially comply with the case plan, their parental
rights may be terminated . . . .” (emphasis added)); 4 NEB. PRAC. Juvenile Court Law & Practice
§ 5:8 (2010) (“A parent’s failure to follow a court-ordered plan of rehabilitation cannot result in
the termination of parental rights unless the terms of the plan are material to the situation, and
to the basis of the adjudication.”).
70. See 25 FLA. JUR. 2D § 292 (“The parent must have had the substantial ability and a
viable opportunity to comply with the case plan . . . .”).
71. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he Department must have made diligent efforts to assist the parent in
meeting the goals of the plan and have made reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and
child.”).
72. State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009); see also
Butera, supra note 5 (“In some cases . . . judges base termination decisions on the fact that the
mother does not have legal status and may be deported. In others, child welfare workers oppose
family reunification because they think that a U.S. citizen child should not live in another
country.”).
73. See infra Part III.C.
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and frequent, unexpected moves to different detention centers, often
74
out of state.
A combination of these factors has resulted in some courts failing
to address the question of whether illegal immigrant parents are
statutorily fit before going on to determine whether their rights
should be terminated. In doing so, courts have failed either to apply
the appropriate evidentiary standard in the fitness inquiry or to
rigorously adhere to the statutory requirements for unfitness, even as
they purport to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard.
A. Inadequate Inquiry into Unfitness
In several recent cases, illegal immigrant parents have faced
state-court termination hearings after being taken into deportation
proceedings. In these cases, the issue has been whether the immigrant
parent’s parental rights should be terminated, and, in each of these
75
cases, at least one court that heard the case found that they should.
Admittedly, two of these cases were later reversed by higher courts,
but as Professor Yablon-Zug suggests, such cases frequently do not
reach states’ higher courts, where termination is more likely to be
76
denied. It is, therefore, instructive to note the problems in the lower
courts’ rationales even when their decisions are overturned, as they
can illuminate why this problem exists.
The outcomes in these recent cases are problematic for two
reasons. First, in some cases, courts fail to apply the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard to the fitness inquiry, even though
the Supreme Court has made it clear that such a standard applies.
Second, even when courts ostensibly apply the clear and convincing
evidence standard, it is not clear that they properly apply the
statutory requirements of finding abandonment, failure to remedy the
persistent condition that caused the child to enter foster care, or
failure to comply with the reunification plan before proceeding to a
best-interests analysis.
1. Failure to Apply the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard.
In at least one case, the clear and convincing evidence standard
appears to have been wholly ignored by courts examining the
74. See infra Part III.C.
75. See infra Part III.A.1–2.
76. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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question of a statutory basis for termination. Ostensibly, the Virginia
Court of Appeals validated the lower court’s failure to apply the
correct standard in 2009 when the appellate court upheld the trial
court’s termination of the parental rights of a Guatemalan father who
77
had been deported from the United States. Victor Perez-Velasquez,
an illegal immigrant, was incarcerated when the Department of Social
Services removed his children, and the Department offered him no
78
services for reunification. The trial court terminated his parental
rights in part because he failed to maintain adequate contact with his
79
children, one statutory way to establish unfitness. The court did find
80
a statutory basis for the termination, but the court referenced the
clear and convincing standard only with respect to the best-interests
81
inquiry and not with respect to the unfitness question. Statutory
82
language and previous cases, as well as the Supreme Court’s holding
83
in Santosky, demonstrate that this standard is required at the
unfitness determination stage.
2. Failure to Remain Faithful to the Requirements of Statutory
Unfitness. Even in cases in which courts purport to apply the clear
and convincing evidence standard, there is good reason to question
whether the standard was met, based on a failure to adhere to the

77. Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4, 2009 WL
1851017, at *1–2 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009).
78. Id. at *1.
79. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(C)(1) (2010) (providing for termination of
parental rights if a parent “without good cause, failed to maintain continuing contact” with the
child).
80. For further discussion of the basis for the termination of Perez-Velasquez’s rights, see
infra Part III.A.2.
81. See Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *1 (noting that certain evidence could
“support a court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the
children will be served by termination” (quoting Ferguson v. Stafford Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
417 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Va. App. 1992))).
82. See, e.g., Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL
1847638, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (reciting the statutory requirement that unfitness
must be established by clear and convincing evidence); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1283(C)(1)–(2) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish unfitness). Tellingly, these
code sections were the basis for termination of Perez-Velasquez’s parental rights, but the court
declined to quote the language requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish unfitness
through abuse, neglect, or failure to remedy, choosing only to quote the additional statutory
requirement that the child’s best interests also be demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence. Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2.
83. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–58 (1982).
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requirements of the statutes in question. In each of the three primary
areas of findings of unfitness, courts have deviated from the statutory
language in making findings of unfitness.
a. Abandonment.
Finding parental unfitness based on
abandonment of the child generally requires a finding either of
84
willfulness or circumstances within the parent’s control. In at least
two cases, courts have ignored or brushed aside that requirement
despite clear evidence suggesting that the failure to contact or support
the child was neither willful nor desired by the parent. This treatment
is out of step with the requirements of the fitness inquiry, as it does
not sufficiently assess fitness under the relevant state statute.
Ms. Bail’s case is a good example. When her son’s foster parents
petitioned the court for the termination of Ms. Bail’s parental rights
85
and the right to adopt her son Carlos, Ms. Bail protested. She wrote
a letter to the foster parents’ attorney stating that she did not want
86
the adoption to occur and requesting visitation with her son.
Despite Ms. Bail’s pleas, Judge David Dally granted both the
87
petition to terminate her parental rights and the adoption petition.
The termination of Ms. Bail’s parental rights was ostensibly based on
her abandonment of Carlos by failing to contact him or send financial
88
support while she was incarcerated, but serious questions remain as
to whether Ms. Bail in fact failed in this way. The abandonment
statutes under which she was found to be unfit required a showing of
willful abandonment or of ability to communicate and failure to do
89
so. Ms. Bail claims that she went to court six times during her
84. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
85. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SC91141, slip op. at 12–13 (Mo.
Jan. 25, 2011) (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), available at http://www.courts.
mo.gov/file.jsp?id=43941.
86. Id., slip op. at 6 (majority opinion).
87. Id., slip op. at 9.
88. Id., slip op. at 32–34; see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(5)(1)(b) (West Supp. 2010)
(authorizing termination of parental rights if a child is abandoned, defined in part as the parent
having “left the child without any provision for parental support and without making
arrangements to visit or communicate with the child, although able to do so”); Thompson, supra
note 2 (“[T]he judge found that she had made no attempt to contact the baby or send financial
support for him . . . .”).
89. The trial court found that Ms. Bail abandoned her son under Missouri Statutes
§§ 453.040(7), 211.447(2)(2)(b). S.M., slip op. at 9. Section 453.040(7) requires “willful[]
abandon[ment]” or “willful[], substantial[] and continuous[] neglect[].” MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 453.040(7) (West Supp. 2010). Likewise, section 211.447(2)(2)(b) allows a court to determine
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incarceration and requested help finding her son each time; no help
90
was provided. It appears that Ms. Bail had no way of knowing where
91
her son was or where she could contact him. After receiving
notification of the adoption petition only in English, she found a
cellmate to translate for her and immediately wrote to the court
92
requesting visitation with her son. Essentially “no effort was made to
locate [Ms. Bail] or to ensure she had knowledge of the termination
93
and adoption proceeding.” In the meantime, she was transferred to a
prison in West Virginia, far from the proceedings that were ensuing to
94
terminate her parental rights.
Mr. Perez-Velasquez’s parental rights were also terminated
based in part on abandonment, though it is not clear that he met the
statutory requirements of abandonment. The statute under which he
was found to have abandoned his children required a lack of good
95
cause for failing to maintain contact with his children. He had not
been told where his children were, however, so he could not contact
them. The court’s response was that the father’s deportation was to
blame for the lack of communication, so he was responsible for failing
96
to maintain contact, proving him unfit. The court, however, provided
no basis in either statutes or case law for its conclusion.
The statute further required that the failure to communicate be
in spite of “reasonable and appropriate efforts of . . . rehabilitative
that a parent has abandoned her child if she has “without good cause, left the child without any
provision for parental support and without making arrangements to visit or communicate with
the child, although able to do so.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2)(2)(b), .447(5)(1)(b) (emphasis
added).
90. Thompson, supra note 2; see also S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No.
SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. July 21, 2010) (“No evidence was presented at
trial to show whether Mother . . . was capable of providing support for Child while she was
imprisoned. Additionally, nothing in the record indicates that Mother knew how to contact
Child or where to find him . . . .”).
91. S.M., slip op. at 12 (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]here is no
evidence that the mother had the opportunity to contact her family to inquire about her
son. . . . [A]ny lack of evidence demonstrating the mother’s efforts to contact her son does not
prove that she in fact did not undertake such efforts. It is simply a gap in the record that reflects
nothing more than the fact that the adoptive parents introduced no evidence tending to disprove
the allegations in their own petition.”)
92. See id., slip op. at 13 (describing the letter requesting visitation).
93. S.M., 2010 WL 2841486, at *3.
94. Thompson, supra note 2.
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(C)(1) (2010).
96. Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4, 2009 WL
1851017, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009).
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agencies to communicate with the parent or parents and to strengthen
97
the parent-child relationship.” Mr. Perez-Velasquez argued that he
was provided no such services to help him maintain contact with his
98
children, but the court, in contravention of the language of the
statute, found that it would have been unreasonable to expect such
99
services to be provided. The court’s only basis for this finding was a
statement in a case holding, in different factual circumstances, that
the state was not required to provide services to help a parent regain
100
custody while he was in prison. In the case relied upon by the court,
the incarcerated father had, in fact, been provided
101
“communicat[ion] . . . as to his daughter’s placement situation,”
giving him the information necessary to find and contact his child,
even from prison.
b. Failure to Remedy the Condition Leading to Removal. Mr.
Perez-Velaquez’s case also demonstrates another problem: when
unfitness is based on the failure to remedy the condition that led to
removal, courts often fail to properly apply the fitness inquiry. The
court appeared to view his deportation as removing all chance of
future communication with his children, quoting with approval the
trial court’s statement that “his subsequent deportation eliminated
any chance that . . . he could participate in remedying, within a
reasonable time, the conditions resulting in the placement and
102
continuation of the children in foster care.” Like the abandonment
statute, the statute basing unfitness on a failure to “remedy
substantially the conditions which led to . . . the child’s foster care
97. VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-283(C)(1).
98. Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2.
99. Id.
100. See id. (adopting the rationale of Harrison v. Tazewell County Department of Social
Services, 590 S.E.2d 575 (Va. Ct. App. 2004)). Harrison is distinguishable from Perez-Velasquez
on two grounds. First, Mr. Perez-Velasquez was denied services even after he left prison,
whereas Mr. Harrison was denied services only during his incarceration. See Harrison, 590
S.E.2d at 583 (describing how Mr. Harrison was offered resources before his incarceration and
remained advised of his child’s placement while incarcerated). Additionally, Mr. Harrison had
previously refused the services offered to him to better his relationship with his child. Id.
(“[T]he record reflects that the Department in fact offered Harrison services before he became
incarcerated and before L.H. was placed in foster care. However, Harrison refused to take
advantage of those services.”). No evidence that Mr. Perez-Velasquez had previously refused
services was presented.
101. Harrison, 590 S.E.2d at 583.
102. Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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placement” required that the Department of Social Services provide
103
him services to that end. In determining that it would have been
unreasonable to require the Department to provide such services, the
court relied on a case that arose in circumstance different from Perez104
Velasquez. Because he would have been able to benefit from the
services, Mr. Perez-Velasquez should have been granted them under
the statute before being determined unfit.
Similarly, in 2005, the Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld the
termination of the parental rights of an illegal Nigerian immigrant on
the ground that she had failed to remedy the persistent condition that
105
required her children to enter foster care. Binta Ahmad was
arrested for theft charges and was unable to make bond, so she

103. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(C)(2) (2010). Notably, Perez-Velasquez calls into question
a positive result in a previous Virginia Court of Appeals case. In 2000, the court affirmed the
denial of Virginia’s petition to terminate the parental rights of Usman Ibrahim, a Ghanaian
national whose three children were placed in foster care after he was arrested. Fairfax Cnty.
Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 1847638, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19,
2000). After Mr. Ibrahim’s deportation, the Commonwealth of Virginia initiated proceedings to
terminate his parental rights. Id. The trial court refused to rule that deportation alone was
sufficient to terminate Mr. Ibrahim’s parental rights and required the state to show that there
was some statutory basis for terminating his parental rights. Id. at *2. The state, however, failed
to do so because the conditions that led to the children entering foster care had been corrected
and because Mr. Ibrahim had not abandoned his children given that he attempted to maintain
contact with them but was thwarted by both the children’s foster parents and the Department of
Family Services. Id. at *2–3 (discussing how Mr. Ibrahim’s attempts to maintain contact with his
children via phone were ruined when the foster parents changed their phone number, and
explaining the numerous failures of the Department of Family Services to keep in contact with
Mr. Ibrahim and to provide him services). On appeal in Ibrahim, the Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that the “framework for terminating parental rights . . . ‘provides detailed procedures
designed to protect the rights of the parents and their child[ren] . . . . [and] must be strictly
followed.’” Id. at *4 (first alteration in original) (quoting Rader v. Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 365 S.E.2d 234, 235–36 (Va. Ct. App. 1988)). In Perez-Velasquez, of course, under
similar facts, the Virginia Court of Appeals found that the Department of Social Services had no
responsibility to help an illegal immigrant father maintain contact with his children while they
were in foster care and consequently upheld the termination of his parental rights. PerezVelasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2–3.
104. See supra note 100. As noted, Mr. Harrison was denied services while in prison, where
he would not have been able to take advantage of them. Mr. Perez-Velasquez, by contrast, was
denied services even after he was deported, when he would have been able to regain custody of
his children. See State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 96 (Neb. 2009)
(noting that Ms. Luis would be able to regain custody of her children after deportation).
105. State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL
975339, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(g)(1),
(3)(A) (2010) (authorizing termination when there is “[a]bandonment by the parent” and when
the child has been removed from the parent’s custody and “[t]he conditions that led to the
child’s removal . . . still persist”).
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106

remained incarcerated for over a year. Subsequently, she was
turned over to immigration officials, who detained her for an
107
additional two years before deporting her to Nigeria. During the
course of her incarceration, her children had primarily resided in
108
foster care; when she was deported, she felt it was in the best
interests of her children to leave them in foster care until she could
109
“relocate to a safe country and reclaim [them].” In spite of her plan
110
to reclaim her children, her parental rights were terminated.
In upholding the termination of Ms. Ahmad’s parental rights, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals found that she “ha[d] been unable to
111
remedy the conditions which led to the removal of her children.”
The condition that led to the removal of her children was her
112
incarceration. The statute under which her purported unfitness was
determined stated that parental rights could be terminated if “[t]he
113
conditions that led to the child’s removal . . . still persist.” Although
114
she was no longer incarcerated at the time of the hearing, the court
found that she nonetheless failed to remedy the condition that led to
115
the removal of her children. In finding Ms. Ahmad to be unfit, the
court avoided the clear language of the statue.
c. Failure to Comply with the Reunification Plan. In finding that
parental rights should be terminated based on a failure to comply
with a reunification plan, courts have ignored the statutory
requirement that the state provide assistance in the completion of
that plan. For example, in 2007, the Nebraska Juvenile Court
106. Ahmad, 2005 WL 975339, at *1.
107. Id.
108. See id. at *1 n.3.
109. Id. at *2 & n.4.
110. Id. at *4.
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id. at *1 n.3.
113. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) (2010).
114. Ahmad, 2005 WL 975339, at *1.
115. Id. at *2. Courts have dealt differently with this issue, though the approach that appears
most logically consistent is found in Fairfax County Department of Family Services v. Ibrahim.
Compare Ahmad, 2005 WL 975339, at *1 (terminating custody of a mother because she “has
been unable to remedy the conditions which led to the removal of her children” when those
conditions were her continued incarceration), with Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v.
Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 1847638, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (“The trial court
found the conditions that brought the children into foster care had been substantially corrected
because . . . the father was no longer incarcerated.”).
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terminated the parental rights of a Guatemalan illegal immigrant
116
after she was put into deportation proceedings. In 1998, Maria Luis
first immigrated to the United States, where she gave birth to her son,
117
118
Daniel. She again illegally entered the country in 2004. Around
the time of her second immigration, she gave birth to her daughter,
119
Angelica. She was arrested in 2005 for “obstructing a government
120
operation” and was subsequently turned over to ICE custody.
When she was deported in 2005, the state refused to return her
121
children to her. The state subsequently developed a case plan that
122
Ms. Luis was required to complete before regaining custody.
Because of a lack of services in Guatemala and the failure of her case
manager to adequately monitor her progress, Ms. Luis failed to
123
“strictly comply with the case plan.” This, combined with the fact
that the children had remained in foster care for fifteen of the
previous twenty-two months, led the lower court to terminate her
124
parental rights. The court “questioned whether parental unfitness
needed to be established in this case in order to terminate parental
rights, but it concluded that, regardless,” “the State had met its

116. State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 88 (Neb. 2009).
117. Id. at 80.
118. Id.
119. Id. Angelica’s citizenship status is unclear because it is unknown whether she was born
in the United States or in Guatemala, during a period in which Ms. Luis briefly returned to that
country. Id.
120. Id. at 82. Ms. Luis’s “obstructi[on of] a government operation” entailed misidentifying
herself as Angelica’s babysitter to a Department of Health and Human Services social worker
and a police officer who came to her home to investigate allegations of abuse. Id. at 81–82. She
misidentified herself in such a fashion because “she was afraid she would lose her children and
be deported” if she gave her real name. Id. at 81.
121. Id. at 82.
122. Id. at 83; see also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1312 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (requiring
the state to create a permanency plan for the child after she is placed in foster care, with an
apparent preference for family reunification).
123. Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 84. The plan required Ms. Luis to maintain a job and
appropriate residence, complete a psychological exam, maintain contact with the case manager
and children, and take a parenting class. Ms. Luis failed to comply because she was unable to
obtain parenting classes and a psychological exam in Guatemala. Id. at 83.
124. Id. at 84; see also id. at 83 (“The court instructed Maria’s counsel to advise her that
failure to comply with the case plan, combined with the children’s being out of the home for 15
or more of the most recent 22 months, would trigger a motion to terminate parental rights.”);
supra Part II.A.
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burden of proof and that termination was in the children’s best
125
interests.”
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized the lower
court’s failure to follow established law for finding unfitness and thus
126
overturned the termination. With regard to the failure to complete
the reunification plan, the court explained that the goals of the plan
must be reasonable and that the state must assist the parent in
127
complying with the plan. The court found that the requirements
with which Ms. Luis had not complied were “not necessary for [her]
to become a fit parent” and that the state had provided insufficient
128
help to her in complying with the plan. Consequently, the statutory
129
grounds for a finding of unfitness had not been met. In dismissing
the other basis for the termination, the court stated that to terminate
parental rights, the state must first prove parental unfitness based on
a statutory reason and asserted that placement of a child in foster care
for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months was in itself insufficient
130
to establish unfitness.
These cases demonstrate situations in which parental rights were
terminated without clear and convincing evidence of parental
unfitness or with an unconvincing application of the statutory
standard for finding unfitness. The next Sections will discuss the two
underlying issues that appear to have caused the problem.
B. Cultural Difference as Unfitness
Cultural bias, as used here, means expressing a preference for
131
one’s own culture and cultural practices over those of another.
Cultural bias in family law cases that involve immigration generally
125. Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 87.
126. Id. at 92.
127. Id. at 95.
128. Id. at 95–96.
129. Id. at 96.
130. Id. at 92.
131. Cultural bias is displayed frequently in discourse over immigration in the United States,
such as the statement made by the attorney for Carlos’s adoptive parents in the Bail case that
“[the U.S. courts] afforded [Bail] more due process than most people get who speak English.”
Thompson, supra note 2; see also Tim Padgett & Dolly Mascareñas, Did a Mother Lose Her
Child Because She Doesn’t Speak English?, TIME (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1918941,00.html (discussing a recent case in which a Mexican mother was
found unfit by the Mississippi Department of Human Services because “her lack of English
‘placed her unborn child in danger and will place the baby in danger in the future’”).
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appears in one of two ways. Courts demonstrate this bias by
expressing the belief that life with American adoptive parents will,
necessarily, be superior to the life that a child could have with her
132
birth parent in the parent’s home country. Alternatively, courts
display cultural bias when addressing the fitness question, failing to
fully adhere to the statutory language on unfitness and instead
allowing considerations such as the parent’s immigration status or
133
deportation to affect the termination decision.
Courts have demonstrated a preference for American parents
with “comfortable liv[es,] . . . stable home[s], and . . . support from
134
their [local] extended family” in a number of cases. Some courts
state it directly; others state it more subtly, by comparing the
environment that the parent can provide in her country of origin to
135
the environment provided by American foster parents.
For
example, in terminating Ms. Bail’s parental rights, Judge Dally
contrasted the “stable home” of the American adoptive parents with
the “only certaint[y]” in Ms. Bail’s future, which was that she would
136
“remain incarcerated . . . and . . . be deported.” Similarly, the
Nebraska Juvenile Court, in terminating Ms. Luis’s parental rights,
132. See Yablon-Zug, supra note 4, at 16 (noting that the definition of a good parent is
“defined in relation to dominant cultural norms”). This focuses on what the court believes to be
the child’s best interests and, by failing to apply the clear and convincing standard at all or by
applying it weakly, passes over the imperative first question of whether the parent was unfit.
Some judges have explicitly expressed their desire to approach the termination inquiry in this
fashion. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 1847638, at *5
(Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (Clements, J., concurring) (“To me, the evidence before us is clear
and convincing that it is in the best interests of these children that the father’s parental rights be
terminated. However, in this case we have been required by the statute to elevate the ‘technical
legal rights of the parent’ over the paramount consideration—the best interests of the children.”
(quoting Forbes v. Haney, 133 S.E.2d 533, 536 (Va. 1963))).
133. See supra Part III.A.2.
134. Thompson, supra note 2.
135. See infra notes 136–40 and accompanying text.
136. Thompson, supra note 2; S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SC91141,
slip op. at 2 (Mo. Jan. 25, 2011) (Wolff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), available at
http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=43941 (“The law does not allow the government to act on
an assumption that one family would be better than another, for to do so would be to authorize
the courts to take away the children of the poor and give them to the rich and to take the
children of foreign-born parents and give them to native-born American families.”); S.M. v.
E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *8 (Mo. Ct. App.
July 21, 2010) (“While the trial court did not expressly say that Respondents could provide a
better home in the United States for Child, it did so through its actions because it found for
Respondents even though it had no knowledge of the type of home Mother could offer to Child
in Guatemala.”).
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relied on testimony about the lack of “economic opportunities” and
the “unfamiliar . . . educational system [and] athletic opportunities
137
available in Guatemala.”
These comparisons, in themselves, suggest a cultural bias against
immigrants. They place an emphasis on the “dominant cultural
138
norms” in American society that define a good parent. These norms
include the notion that a “good parent” will be able to provide a large
home with private space for the child, along with education and
139
medical care that meet American standards. The suggestion that the
adoptive parents would be better parents for Carlos because of their
“comfortable lives” may reflect the norm that a good parent is one
who can provide a private space for her child. Likewise, the
restatement of testimony indicating that economic and educational
opportunities might not be as great in Guatemala as in the United
States may reflect the norm that good parents are those able to
provide their children with the best educational and economic
options, as defined by American standards. More directly, scholars
have noted the increasingly common norm that a good parent is a
140
nonimmigrant parent. This embodies a view that anything incident
to status as an undocumented immigrant—including deportation or
incarceration pending deportation—makes one a bad parent.
Recognition of this bias suggests that Judge Dally’s comment about
Ms. Bail’s future may have been laced with unconscious bias, rather
than fully based in concern over the impact of a temporary separation
of mother and child.
The Nebraska Supreme Court recognized this as an unacceptable
practice that had been used by the juvenile court to terminate Ms.
Luis’s parental rights. In acknowledging the cultural bias displayed by
the lower court, the appellate court stated that
the “best interests” of the child standard does not require simply
that a determination be made that one environment or set of
circumstances is superior to another. . . . [U]nless [Ms. Luis] is found
to be unfit, the fact that the state considers certain adoptive

137. State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 85 (Neb. 2009).
138. See Yablon-Zug, supra note 4, at 16.
139. Id. at 17.
140. See, e.g., id. at 19 (noting that immigrant parents “may also be subject to the
proliferating negative views of undocumented immigrants” and that “the language, culture, and
values associated with undocumented immigrants are openly considered undesirable”).
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parents . . . “better,” or this environment “better,” does not
overcome the commanding presumption that reuniting the children
with [their parent] is in their best interests—no matter what country
141
[the parent] lives in.

Cultural bias also plays a role in each of the three ways that
courts have established unfitness in these cases—abandonment,
failure to remedy the condition that caused the child to enter foster
care, and failure to comply with the reunification plan. When
abandonment is used to prove unfitness, it is based on the parent’s
incarceration pending deportation—something for which courts
142
blame parents, even when the decision to immigrate and risk
143
deportation was made for the benefit of the child. When courts look
to failure to remedy as proof of unfitness, they demonstrate cultural
bias in two ways. First, as with the abandonment basis, the condition
that caused the child to enter foster care is the parent’s arrest for
deportation proceedings, something that some courts have considered
a significant-enough fault to justify inferior treatment vis-à-vis
144
entitlements to the services that help to remedy the condition.
Second, some courts have expressed the opinion that once deported,
145
parents cannot remedy the condition because they have forfeited
146
their rights to their children by leaving the country.
Finally, courts display cultural bias in applying failure to
complete a reunification plan as a means to establish unfitness. This
bias is most often based on a belief that once deported, the parent will
be unable to comply with the reunification plan or on an assessment

141. Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 94; see also S.M., 2010 WL 2841486, at *8 (quoting with
approval the Nebraska Supreme Court’s statement that “the ‘best interests’ of the child
standard does not require simply that a determination be made that one environment or set of
circumstances is superior to another”).
142. See, e.g., Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4, 2009
WL 1851017, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009) (“[F]ather’s own actions led to this
situation. . . . [H]is incarceration and deportation affected his ability to contact his children and
participate in the foster care proceedings.”).
143. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
144. See Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2 (finding that it would be “unreasonable”
to provide someone who had been incarcerated and taken into deportation proceedings services
that would enable him to reunite with his child).
145. See, e.g., id. at *2 (“His . . . subsequent deportation eliminated any chance that he could
maintain contact with the children . . . .” (quoting the trial court opinion)).
146. But see supra note 43, discussing a fit illegal immigrant parent’s right to take her U.S.
citizen child with her upon deportation.
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of plan completion that does not recognize the variation in services
147
available in other countries. In determining that parental rights
should be terminated because of failure to complete a reunification
plan, one court has found that the parent failed to strictly comply with
148
the plan, despite evidence that compliance was sufficient given the
149
circumstances.
In addition to importing cultural bias into analysis of existing
statutory bases for unfitness, cultural bias against immigrants allows
courts to find unfitness based on a parent’s illegal entry into the
United States or on the parent’s status as an undocumented
immigrant. In terminating Ms. Bail’s parental rights, for example,
Judge Dally condemned Ms. Bail’s choice to come to the United
States, writing that her “lifestyle, that of smuggling herself into a
150
country illegally . . . is not a lifestyle . . . for a child.” Similarly, in
upholding the termination of Ms. Ahmad’s parental rights, the Court
of Appeals of Tennessee blamed her choice to come to the United
States for the termination of her rights, noting that, “[p]erhaps
termination of [Ms. Ahmad’s] parental rights would not have been
151
necessary had [she] not migrated illegally to the United States.” In
terminating Ms. Luis’s parental rights, the Nebraska Juvenile Court
cited her “unauthorized trip to the United States with a newborn
premature infant or . . . g[iving] birth to a premature infant in the
United States” and “[b]eing in the status of an undocumented
152
immigrant” as examples of her failures as a parent. Likewise, Mr.
Perez-Velasquez’s “own actions” were found to have “led to” the
termination of his parental rights because “his incarceration and
153
deportation affected his ability to contact his children.”

147. See supra notes 13, 123 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
150. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *4
(Mo. Ct. App. July 21, 2010).
151. State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL
975339, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005).
152. State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 88 (Neb. 2009).
153. Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2. Despite what some might perceive as a valid
position—that immigrating to and living in the United States illegally is a poor situation in
which to raise a child—that view has been challenged by courts, academics, and non-profits. The
Nebraska Supreme Court, for example, recognized that illegally entering the United States and
having the status of an undocumented immigrant was an insufficient reason—one based on
cultural bias—for terminating parental rights. In overturning Ms. Luis’s termination, the court
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These cases suggest that cultural bias affects courts’ termination
decisions. The Supreme Court has warned that such cultural biases
154
may improperly affect termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. It
is up to state courts to heed this warning and follow the law fairly. At
least two courts have been successful, though not without having to
155
chastise lower courts for their willingness to allow a “culture clash”
156
to dictate the outcome of their decisions. Although these courts can
serve as a model for other courts, other measures will be necessary to
address the second problematic factor in these cases—the
incarceration of the parents.
C. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The realities of prison life present special challenges for parents
facing termination of their parental rights, often exacerbated for
illegal immigrants who are in prison pending deportation
proceedings. The most important of these challenges are barriers to
communication and the use of parental incarceration as a ground for
refused to “conclude that [Ms. Luis’s] attempt to bring herself and her child into the United
States, in the belief that they would have a better life here, shows an appreciable absence of
care, concern, or judgment.” Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 93. Professor David Thronson has
similarly labeled judges as culturally biased when, for example, a judge terminated a father’s
parental rights based on the father’s failure to gain legal status in the United States and on his
likelihood of deportation. David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the
Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 45,
54 (2005). A 2010 report from First Focus and the Migration and Child Welfare National
Network noted that “biased family court judges may inappropriately base their decision[s]
on . . . parent[s’] immigration status rather than their demonstrated parenting capacity.” Wendy
Cervantes & Yali Lincroft, The Impact of Immigration Enforcement on Child Welfare, CAUGHT
BETWEEN SYS. (First Focus & Migration & Child Welfare Nat’l Network, Wash., D.C.),
Mar. 2010, at 1, 4–5, available at http://www.firstfocus.net/sites/default/files/CaughtBetween
Systems.pdf.
154. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (“Because parents subject to
termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups, such
proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class bias.” (citation
omitted)).
155. Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 93 (“What we are dealing with here is a culture clash.”).
156. See S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486,
at *7 (Mo. Ct. App. July 21, 2010) (“If Mother’s immigration status was considered as a factor,
we note that immigration status has never been one of the factors to consider when determining
whether to terminate parental rights. . . . While the trial court did not expressly say that
Respondents could provide a better home in the United States for Child, it did so through its
actions because it found for Respondents even though it had no knowledge of the type of home
Mother could offer to Child in Guatemala.”); Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 94 (“[W]hether living in
Guatemala or the United States is more comfortable for the children is not determinative of the
children’s best interests.”).
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termination of parental rights because of the length of incarceration
or the fact of incarceration itself.
Illegal immigrants can arrive in prison in one of two ways. First,
they may be arrested strictly for immigration violations, resulting in
157
their detention in an ICE facility. Second, they may be arrested for
158
a crime by local, state, or federal law enforcement officials. After
the arrest, they can be sentenced for the crime through the state or
federal court system and then will generally be held in state or federal
prison for the duration of their sentence before being transferred into
159
ICE custody. If the crime is an immigration crime for which an
arrest is made at the local or state level, the arresting officer must
contact federal authorities and transfer the immigrant to ICE
160
custody. Alternatively, the criminal charges may be dropped, at
which time the immigrant would most likely be transferred to ICE
161
custody for deportation proceedings.
When an illegal immigrant is arrested by state or local
authorities, a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act
162
(INA)
allows those officials to carry out the functions of
immigration officials, provided the officials meet certain
163
requirements. Section 287(g) of the INA allows state and local

157. See Fact Sheet: Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detention-mgmt.htm (last visited
Feb. 8, 2011) (noting that, as of November 20, 2008, “ICE . . . uses more than 300 local and state
facilities operating under intergovernmental service agreements; seven contract detention
facilities and eight ICE-owned facilities” to hold detainees).
158. See Solomon Moore, Study Shows Sharp Rise in Latino Federal Convicts, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2009, at A14 (discussing the transfer of illegal immigrants into ICE custody after they
have served their federal criminal sentences); Jennifer Steinhauer, Arizona Prisons Plan to
Transfer Illegal Immigrants to Federal Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at A23 (discussing
the transfer of illegal immigrants convicted of state crimes to federal custody).
159. See Moore, supra note 158 (“Federal prisoners who are illegal immigrants are usually
deported to their home countries after serving their sentences.”).
160. Kris W. Kobach, State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law: A Unified
Approach for Stopping Terrorists, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Wash.,
D.C.), June 2004, at 1, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/back604.pdf.
161. See, e.g., Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 82 (“Shortly after her arrest. [sic] [for criminal
charges] Maria was taken into custody by . . . [ICE]. The original [criminal] charges . . . were not
pursued.”).
162. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)).
163. INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g); see also Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration
Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011)
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officials who have been trained by ICE to detain illegal immigrants
and charge them for immigration violations, which begins the removal
164
process. They may do so after arresting an immigrant for federal
immigration violations or after arresting the immigrant for other
165
criminal charges and subsequently identifying her as an illegal alien.
This contributes to the number of illegal immigrants being held in
166
state and local prisons and jails.
1. Barriers to Communication. Incarcerated parents face a
number of hurdles when attempting to communicate with their
children. These difficulties are present in state and federal prisons,
167
where illegal immigrants are often held, and it is reasonable to
168
assume that they also exist at ICE facilities.
Telephone is one of the primary methods of communication for
incarcerated parents and their children. Because prisons use
expensive collect calling systems that require the receiving party to
169
pay costly charges, however, this form of communication may be

(describing the § 287(g) program and listing requirements for participation).
164. See INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (“[T]he Attorney General may enter into a
written agreement . . . pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who
is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration
officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United
States . . . may carry out such function . . . .”); see also Jessica M. Vaughan & James R. Edwards,
Jr., The 287(g) Program: Protecting Home Towns and Homeland, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for
Immigration Studies, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 2009, at 3, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2009/
287g.pdf (“Memoranda of agreement . . . enable local police to assist federal authorities in the
investigation, arrest, detention, and transportation of illegal aliens . . . .”); id. at 3 (“While state
and local officers have inherent legal authority to make immigration arrests, 287(g) provides
additional enforcement authority to the selected officers such as the ability to charge illegal
aliens with immigration violations, beginning the process of removal.”).
165. See Vaughan & Edwards, supra note 164, at 3 (“[S]tate and local officers have inherent
legal authority to make immigration arrests.”); id. at 6 (“Having jail intake officers identify
illegal aliens at the time of booking [for non-immigration crimes] ensures that they will be
flagged for removal before release.”).
166. See Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
Nationality Act, supra note 163 (“Since January 2006, the 287(g) program is credited with
identifying more than 185,000 potentially removable aliens—mostly at local jails.” (emphasis
added)).
167. See supra Notes 156–65.
168. This is a reasonable assumption both because ICE facilities, by their limited nature, are
often farther from the immigrant’s home and because ICE facilities are federal facilities,
suggesting that federal statistics provided herein are relevant to ICE facilities.
169. See TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 6 (discussing the high costs of collect calls in
prisons).
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unavailable to incarcerated parents if the child’s caregiver is unable or
170
unwilling to accept the charges. Furthermore, foster parents may be
unwilling to allow communication via telephone at all and may refuse
to accept collect call charges or provide the correct phone number to
171
the biological parent. Finally, correction facility policies often limit
172
the number of calls a prisoner is allowed to receive.
Whatever the reason, in 2004, 15 percent of parents incarcerated
in federal prisons had never spoken with their children via
173
telephone. Nearly another 30 percent of parents spoke to their
174
children via telephone only monthly or less frequently. In state
prisons, the numbers were worse: 47 percent of parents had never
175
contacted their children via telephone. Given that “[t]he probability
of termination increases as a result of . . . limited contact [between]
176
incarcerated parents . . . [and] their children,” this communication
barrier represents a significant problem for incarcerated parents who
want to maintain custody of their children.
As difficult as telephone communication is, problems arranging
face-to-face visitation for incarcerated parents are even greater.
Foster parents may be reluctant to arrange, participate in, or
170. Laughlin et al., supra note 50, at 222.
171. Because foster parents are not required to help maintain contact of any sort, it is
possible that problems of foster parents withholding communication are prevalent in this area.
See id. (“When children of incarcerated [parents] are placed in foster homes, foster parents are
under no obligation to facilitate visits or any other type of contact between the child and the
[parent] . . . .”); see also State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 83
(Neb. 2009) (“Although [the immigrant mother] wanted to initiate telephone calls with her
children [in foster care], she was not provided with a telephone number to contact the children
and any contact with the children had to be initiated by their foster parents.”); Fairfax Cnty.
Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 1847638, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19,
2000) (noting that communication between an incarcerated illegal immigrant parent and his
children was terminated because the children’s foster parents changed their phone number).
172. See TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 1 (“The number of calls . . . per prisoner is
typically limited by corrections policy.”); see also RANDY CAPPS, ROSA MARIA CASTAÑEDA,
AJAY CHAUDRY & ROBERT SANTOS, PAYING THE PRICE: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION
RAIDS ON AMERICA’S CHILDREN 2 (2007) (“Detained immigrants had very limited access to
telephones to communicate with their families . . . .”).
173. LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR
MINOR CHILDREN 18 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report No. NCJ 222984, 2008),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Ellen Barry, River Ginchild & Doreen Lee, Legal Issues for Prisoners with Children, in
CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 147, 151 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds.,
1995).
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177

This reluctance may be
otherwise facilitate in-person visits.
aggravated by the distances that must often be traveled for a personal
visit to occur. Prisons are generally located in rural areas, far from the
urban and suburban areas where the majority of the population
resides. This is often worse for mothers than for fathers, as there are
fewer prisons for women, which results in incarcerated mothers being
178
held further from their last place of residence. In 1997, 84 percent of
parents incarcerated in federal prisons were housed more than one
hundred miles from their last place of residence, often the place of
179
residence they shared with their child prior to incarceration. Fortythree percent of parents in federal prisons were held more than five
180
hundred miles from their last place of residence. The picture is
slightly better for parents incarcerated in state prisons, though over
half of those parents were held in a prison more than one hundred
181
miles from their homes. Recent reports suggest that this trend
182
continues today. In 2004, these often-insurmountable difficulties
resulted in 45 percent of federally incarcerated parents never having a
personal visit with their child and another 36 percent having personal
visits less than once a month through the duration of their
183
incarceration.
Additionally, nearly 60 percent of parents
incarcerated in state prisons had never been personally visited by
184
their children.
177. See TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 5 (listing “[f]oster parents . . . who are unwilling to
facilitate visits” as an “obstacle[] to parent-child visits in prison”); see also supra note 171.
178. Laughlin et al., supra note 50, at 222.
179. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 5
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report No. NCJ 182335, 2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., LIS Inc., NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS INFO. CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SERVICES FOR FAMILIES OF PRISON INMATES 4 (2002) (noting that although some corrections
agencies use proximity to family as a basis for inmate assignment to a particular location, an
equal number do not or cannot because of facility limitations); Laughlin et al., supra note 50, at
222 (discussing geographic distance as a continuing impediment to personal visitation between
incarcerated parents and their children); Immigrant Detainees Denied Access to Lawyers, THE
BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES, (Sept. 14, 2010, 4:13 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/09/
thousands-of-people-in-immigration-detention-facilities-are-unable-to-get-lawyers-because-ofgeographically-isolated-facili.html (“The geographic isolation of many of the facilities is
stark . . . . For example, [one jail] is 346 miles from the nearest city. [Another] facility . . . is 315
miles from the closest city.”).
183. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 173, at 18.
184. Id.
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This problem is likely to be even worse for illegal immigrants
who are held pending deportation because they are “routinely
transferred to more remote jails” and may be “moved from state to
185
state without notice.” In at least one case, transfer out of the state
has been used as a factor in terminating an illegal immigrant parent’s
186
rights. On the whole, barriers to personal visitation for immigrant
and nonimmigrant parents alike are immense; the special
circumstances of immigrant parents only serve to lessen their ability
to successfully organize a personal visit.
If a visit is successfully arranged, the problems have not ceased
for the incarcerated parent. Poor visiting conditions are rampant
because of prison procedures that restrict visitation for security
187
reasons, subject visitors to embarrassing searches, and create
188
conditions that are inhospitable to children. In the prison setting, a
189
“security and safety rationale [often] dominates,” leading prisons to
develop visitation policies in conformity with the “institution’s
190
schedule, space and personnel constraint[s],” rather than those
conducive to meaningful visits. These policies often mean that
children visiting their parents must come at a certain time of day, wait
191
long periods of time to be let in for the visit, and avoid physical
contact during the visit, often being required to speak via phone to

185. Nina Bernstein, Immigrant Jail Tests U.S. View of Legal Access, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
2009, at A1. This movement generally occurs when an immigrant is being transferred to an
official ICE facility, located in only a handful of states. See also CAPPS ET AL., supra note 172, at
2 (noting that “many [detained immigrants] were moved to remote detention facilities out of the
states in which they were arrested”).
186. See State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005
WL 975339, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005) (finding that termination was proper in part
because Ms. Ahmad’s children had only been able to visit her twice during the six years of her
incarceration due to her transfer from a facility in Alabama to one in Louisiana).
187. Hairston, supra note 53, at 10. Hairston also notes that visitors are subject to body
scans. Id.; see also Barry et al., supra note 176, at 151 (“[T]here have been several instances
where children have been strip-searched or pat-searched by correctional staff who claimed they
had to do so because of ‘security concerns.’”).
188. See, e.g., TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 5 (listing “obstacles to parent-child visits in
prison”); Hairston, supra note 53, at 10 (describing the conditions faced by prison visitors,
particularly child visitors).
189. Hairston, supra note 53, at 10.
190. Pamela Lewis, Comment, Behind the Glass Wall: Barriers that Incarcerated Parents
Face Regarding the Care, Custody and Control of Their Children, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
LAW. 97, 108 (2004).
191. See Hairston, supra note 53, at 10 (discussing how prison visitors must wait for
visitation times).
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their parent. Consequently, even when prison visits are granted for
incarcerated parents, these obstacles may make visits difficult for
children to attend and even more difficult for the parent and child to
enjoy in a productive way.
2. Incarceration as a Demonstration of Unfitness. The ASFA
requires that states begin termination proceedings against any parent
whose child has been in foster care for fifteen out of the previous
twenty-two months. For many undocumented parents, entering
deportation proceedings means that the ASFA will inevitably be
triggered. Once the parent is arrested, the child is likely to be placed
192
in foster care, and between spending time in jail and being
deported, the parent is likely to be unable to care for the child for a
193
period of fifteen or more months.
In addition to the ASFA, at least twelve states have laws that
base termination of parental rights on the length of a parent’s stay in
194
prison, regardless of the type of crime committed by the parent.
These statutes make it difficult for any incarcerated parent to
maintain parental rights and can be quite hard on illegal immigrant
parents who may be held pending deportation for years. These
192. See Wendy Cervantes, Protecting the Children of Immigrants, IMMIGR. PROF BLOG
(May 30, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2010/05/protect-the-children-ofimmigrants.html (“Often, detained parents are not able to make child care arrangements,
resulting in the unnecessary placement of their children in the child welfare system. Once a child
is placed into foster care, it is extremely difficult for a detained parent to reunify with his or her
child, especially if that parent is transferred to an out-of-state detention facility or deported
before regaining custody of his or her child.”).
193. See, e.g., State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 81–82, 84
(Neb. 2009) (noting that because Ms. Luis was taken into custody and subsequently deported,
her children had been in foster care for seventeen months when the petition to terminate her
parental rights was filed); State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COAR3-PT, 2005 WL 975339, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005) (noting that Ms. Ahmad was
held in prison for over a year on criminal charges and then transferred to immigration custody
before being deported in December 2002, and that her children had been in foster care since
September 2000).
194. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2005(1)(e) (2009) (allowing termination of parental
rights based on incarceration for “a substantial period of time during the child's minority”); LA.
CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015(6) (2004) (allowing termination of parental rights if incarceration
will prevent the parent from caring for the child for “an extended period of time”); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 2151.414(E)(12) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) (allowing termination of parental
rights based on incarceration for at least eighteen months); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A26.1(4) (2004 & Supp. 2010) (allowing the court to find good cause to terminate the parental
rights of a parent who “[i]s incarcerated and is unavailable to care for the child during a
significant period of the child’s minority”).
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statutes range from providing a short, specific number of years of
195
incarceration that proves unfitness to broader statutes that allow
incarceration for a “substantial” or “extended” period of time to be a
196
ground for finding parental unfitness. The short duration of the
former is difficult for illegal immigrants to avoid given that many of
them are incarcerated first for the crime that brought them to the
attention of the criminal justice system and then for a longer period of
197
time pending deportation. The indefinite language of the latter
statutes can be especially difficult on illegal immigrants because a
judge who is culturally biased in favor of American adoptive parents
will have plenty of leeway to find that the immigrant parent has been
incarcerated long enough to meet the statutory definition of
198
unfitness.
Finally, at least ten states have other statutes that could lead to
the termination of an incarcerated parent’s parental rights. These
statutes generally allow courts to find that a parent is unfit or to
refuse to attempt to reunite the parent and child if the parent has
199
failed to maintain contact with the child for a period of time. Many

195. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(2)(b) (West 2006) (providing that a period of
incarceration of at least one year is an aggravating circumstance and allowing the state to
dispense with making “[r]easonable efforts” toward reunification if the child has been subjected
to an aggravating circumstance); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3)(h) (West 2002 &
Supp. 2010) (providing that a period of incarceration in excess of two years combined with a
failure to provide for the child’s care and custody is grounds for terminating the parent’s rights).
196. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5)(a)(3) (2009) (allowing termination of
parental rights if the parent “is incapable of discharging parental responsibilities due to
extended . . . incarceration”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(1)(d)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010)
(allowing termination of parental rights when the parent is incarcerated for “a substantial
portion of the period of time before the child” turns eighteen); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i)
(2003) (requiring the court to terminate parental rights if the parent is imprisoned for “an
extended period of time”).
197. See, e.g., Ahmad, 2005 WL 975339, at *1 (discussing the case of a mother who was
arrested for felony theft charges for which she was incarcerated for one year before being
turned over to immigration officials and imprisoned for another two years before deportation);
see also supra Notes 156–65.
198. In many cases involving the termination of incarcerated immigrants’ parental rights,
courts focus on the length of time that the immigrant’s child is in foster care. For example, one
court pointed out that the children had been in foster care for “more than half of each child’s
life” before terminating an immigrant mother’s parental rights. Ahmad, 2005 WL 975339, at *2.
199. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(1) (West Supp. 2010) (providing that
courts do not have to offer reunification services before terminating parental rights if “the
parent has failed to visit or contact the child for six months”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 50/1(D) (West 2008) (“The grounds of unfitness [include] . . . (n) [e]vidence of intent to
forgo . . . parental rights . . . (1) as manifested by . . . failure for a period of 12 months: (i) to visit
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of these statutes make no exceptions for the parent’s inability to
maintain contact, which can be a problem for any incarcerated parent
who is unable to reach her children via telephone or to arrange an in200
person visit.
These statutes can be particularly perilous for
incarcerated immigrant parents who often face considerable
201
geographic barriers to communication with their children.
IV. APPROACHING A SOLUTION
As explained in Part I, the state of constitutional law currently
views the termination of parental rights with a wary eye and affords
parents protection from termination in the form of procedural
safeguards designed to prevent undue violations of their rights. In the
context of illegal immigrants taken into deportation proceedings,
however, these safeguards are failing. To begin to remedy the
growing problem of illegal immigrants losing their parental rights
during incarceration, both contributing factors—cultural bias and
prison issues—must be addressed. Amendments or additions to state
and federal law, as well as stricter adherence to an existing
international treaty, can begin to address these problems to varying
degrees. The general approach should be a preference for keeping
202
families together, indifferent to the ultimate country of residence.
This approach is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, which

the child, (ii) to communicate with the child . . . or (iii) to maintain contact with . . . the
child . . . .”); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(c)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (stating that when a
child has been placed outside of the home for at least six months, the court may consider in the
unfitness inquiry a parent’s failure to “maintain[] significant and meaningful contact with the
child during [those] six months”). Other states with similar statutes include Arkansas, Iowa,
Michigan, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington. See CHILD WELFARE INFO.
GATEWAY, supra note 61, at 10, 13, 22, 30, 32, 48, 58–59.
200. See supra Part III.C.1.
201. See supra notes 178–86 and accompanying text.
202. Professor Thronson notes that when immigration law attempts to achieve family
integrity, it is “indifferent to place” and expresses “no preference for a family staying in the
United States over leaving.” Thronson, supra note 43, at 1185–86. Thronson further notes that
in considering hardship applications, which allow illegal immigrants to stay in the United States
upon a showing that their deportation would create an extreme hardship to one of their
dependents, courts will generally not grant applications that only argue that “children will not
have the same levels of education, health care and economic opportunities [in their home
country] that they would have in the United States.” Id. at 1172.
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203

expresses a preference for family unity, and draws on immigration
204
law principles.
The road to a solution is not an uncharted one. At the national
level, legislation was introduced in the 111th Session of Congress to
work toward keeping immigrant families together, even when parents
205
and children are separated because of prison or deportation issues.
At the state level, court opinions and statutes exist in a handful of
states that, if adopted in other states, would resolve many of the bias206
and prison-related issues. Additionally, the United States is party to
an international agreement that, if followed, would provide relief
207
from the effects of cultural bias. Widespread adoption and faithful
implementation of these existing laws collectively represent the path
to success. If this path is followed, the United States can begin to
ensure that no matter the other problems with the current
immigration system, unnecessarily robbing immigrant parents of their
parental rights will not be one of them.
A. Help Family Integrity by HELPing the ASFA
A serious problem for undocumented immigrant parents is the
ASFA’s requirement that states initiate termination proceedings
against any parent whose child has been in foster care for fifteen out
of the previous twenty-two months. For immigrants who are taken
into deportation proceedings and forced to leave their children in
foster care while they are in prison or deported, state compliance with
the ASFA’s requirements can often result in termination proceedings
in which many immigrants lack the resources to defend themselves.
208
Federal legislation proposed in the last congressional session would
203. See supra Part I.
204. See supra note 202. Although authorities on the intersection of family and immigration
law generally agree that immigration law practices are dangerous to families, this is one area in
which immigration law’s approach can be beneficial. See, e.g., Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a
“Best Interests of the Child” Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120, 123 (2009) (arguing that immigration law’s failure to consider the best
interests of children has a negative effect on families).
205. See infra Part IV.A.
206. See infra Part IV.B.
207. See infra Part IV.C.
208. As of the beginning of the 112th Session of Congress, the HELP Separated Children
Act is off the table for consideration unless reintroduced. H.R.3531—HELP Separated Children
Act, OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h3531/show (last visited Feb. 8,
2011); H.R. 3531: HELP Separated Children Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/
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have amended the ASFA to require states to “create and implement
209
on dealing with separated children, defined as
protocols”
individuals who are legally in the United States, have a parent or legal
guardian who has been detained for immigration reasons or who has
210
been deported, and are in the foster care system. Titled the Humane
Enforcement and Legal Protections (HELP) Separated Children
211
Act, this Act would, if reintroduced and adopted, require that states
develop separated-children guidelines that account for the best
212
interests of the child and the best outcome for the child’s family.
The law would also require that parents and children be provided
with a case manager or interpreter who speaks their native language
and that parents who wish to take their children with them during
deportation be given adequate time to collect all necessary
213
documents. These requirements would make cultural sensitivity and
respect for the parental rights of illegal immigrants a part of the law
by recognizing the barriers that immigrant parents face in custody
matters and affirming their right to take their citizen children with
them upon deportation.
Most importantly, the Act would require states to implement
protocols that “ensure that . . . decisions [about care, custody, and
placement of the child] are based on clearly articulated factors that do
not include predictions or conclusions about immigration status or
214
pending Federal immigration proceedings.” This requirement would
effectively shift the focus from the parent’s immigration status to the
proper inquiry—parental fitness. With proper interpretation and
execution, this provision could prevent states from ignoring the clear
and convincing evidentiary standard in the fitness inquiry or from
avoiding the required language of fitness statutes in favor of an
inquiry focused on what the parent can provide in her country of
origin.
The inclusion of consideration of the best interests of the family
and the prohibition of the use of immigration status as a factor in the
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-3531 (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
209. HELP Separated Children Act, H.R. 3531, 111th Cong. § 6(a)(3)(A) (2009).
210. Id. § 6(c).
211. HELP Separated Children Act, H.R. 3531, 111th Cong. (2009).
212. Id. § 6(a)(3)(B), (E).
213. Id. § 6(a)(3)(D), (F).
214. Id. § 6(a)(3)(E) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 142, 144–53 and accompanying
text.
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placement determination are good beginnings, but to eradicate the
use of cultural bias by the courts, the Act, if reintroduced, should be
amended to go further. In its initial formulation, it relied heavily on
215
best-interests-of-the-child language, which is the same language on
which some courts have relied to improperly terminate immigrants’
216
parental rights. A reintroduced version of the Act should clearly
define best interests of the child and best interests of the family,
including in those definitions a presumption that family reunification
is in the best interests of all parties, absent a showing of parental
unfitness. An updated version should also specify that the fitness
inquiry is to be undertaken before the best-interests inquiry, keeping
with current constitutional law.
If adopted, the HELP Separated Children Act might also address
some of the difficulties that prison life poses for retention of parental
rights. As initially proposed, the Act might have removed some of the
barriers to communication faced by undocumented parents while in
prison. For example, the proposed version of the legislation would
have required that detention facilities holding parents for
immigration reasons “take steps to preserve family unity and ensure
the best outcome for families,” in part by ensuring that detained
parents are given “free and confidential phone calls with their
217
children on a daily basis . . . .” The adoption of such a law at the
federal level would make great strides toward ensuring sufficient
communication between incarcerated immigrant parents and their
children.
Additionally, barriers to visitation can be reduced by requiring
that immigrants with children be held in facilities within a reasonable
distance of their children, that they not be moved to new facilities
without notice and before necessary to place them in an ICE facility,
218
and that foster parents participate in personal visits. The proposed
version of the HELP Separated Children Act would have begun to
implement these changes by requiring that detained parents be
219
“permitted regular contact visits with their children.” The proposed

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

E.g., H.R. 3531 §§ 3(b)(14), 6(a)(6).
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
H.R. 3531 § 9(a), (c)(1).
See supra Part III.C.1.
H.R. 3531 § 9(c)(2).
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version of the Act would also have mandated that the location of the
220
parent be noted in the plan to provide services to the child.
The HELP Separated Children Act, however, could be modified
to more fully address prison barriers to retention of parental rights.
Since adoption of the Act would require its reintroduction in the new
session of Congress, there is presently an opportunity for such
modification. First, although the proposed language would have
mandated regular contact visits for detained parents, it did not specify
what type of contact would have been required, and would not have
221
explicitly required foster parents to facilitate the contact.
Additionally, though the Act would have required that the service
plan note the parent’s location, it would not have made any
provisions for keeping that location the same throughout the
incarceration or notifying the child and the child’s foster parents of
any changes in that location. To better address the problem of failed
communication between incarcerated parents and their children, a
reintroduced version should require that parents be held in facilities
within a certain distance of their children and that they not be moved
222
without notice, and it should define the parameters of the foster
parent’s responsibilities explicitly.
One final problem relates to the application of the fifteen-out-ofthe-previous-twenty-two-months rule currently in the ASFA. The
initial version of the HELP Separated Children Act did not
specifically address how separated children are to be treated with
223
regard to this ASFA requirement. Though the proposed version
would have added the definition of “separated child” to the section of
224
the ASFA imposing this requirement, it would not have given any
indication whether the fifteen-month requirement would continue to
apply to separated children. For the Act to work toward eradicating
220. Id. § 6(b).
221. See id. § 9(c)(2) (granting detained parents, guardians, and caregivers “regular contact
visits with their children”).
222. Some states already do this. See Laughlin et al., supra note 50, at 222 (noting that half
of all prisons try to house inmates in the facilities that are closest to their families).
Alternatively, children could be placed in foster homes that are close to the facility where their
parent will be held. See Barry et al., supra note 176, at 154 (“Children who must be placed in
foster care outside of their families should be placed in homes as near to their parents as
possible in order to decrease traveling time and distance . . . .”). This works, however, only if
parents are not frequently transferred to other facilities.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006).
224. H.R. 3531 § 6(c).
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prison-life issues, a reintroduced version should be amended to make
the fifteen-month termination-proceeding-initiation requirement
225
Reintroduced with these
inapplicable to separated children.
modifications, this piece of legislation would be a valuable first step in
ameliorating prison-life issues in custody proceedings for illegal
226
immigrants and should therefore be reintroduced and adopted.
Adoption of a modified version of the HELP Separated Children
Act would help prevent cultural bias from driving judicial
determinations regarding parental rights. Providing parents with
consistent contact with their children would help address some of the
prison-life barriers to parental rights—a goal that the modified Act
could achieve. Changes to state and international law, however, are
also required.
B. State Law Changes
States should adopt two types of laws to alleviate cultural bias
and remedy prison-life barriers to the maintenance of parental rights.
First, states should adopt laws that explicitly assert that initiation of
deportation proceedings is not a ground for terminating parental
rights. Such laws would set a statutory threshold of unfitness that rises
above merely facing deportation proceedings. This would provide
immigrants with statutory protection from judges who believe that
227
immigration status alone bears on a parent’s fitness.
This approach is not without precedent. At least one state court
has recognized that “[parents do] not forfeit [their] parental rights
228
because [they are] deported.” A model for such an approach is
225. In its state version of the fifteen-month requirement, New Mexico makes a similar
exception. It provides that termination proceedings should not be initiated by the state, even if
the child has been in foster care for fifteen out of the previous twenty-two months, “if the child
is an unaccompanied, refugee minor and the situation regarding the child involves international
legal issues or compelling foreign policy issues.” N.M. STAT. § 32A-4-29(G)(7) (Supp. 2009).
Alternatively, states could take the position adopted in State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of
Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009). There, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that “a
child ha[ving] been placed outside the home for 15 or more of the most recent 22 months does
not demonstrate parental unfitness” but “merely provides a guideline for what would be a
reasonable time for parents to rehabilitate themselves to a minimum level of fitness.” Id. at 92.
226. See supra note 208.
227. See Thronson, supra note 153, at 54 (discussing a family law case in Georgia in which
the trial judge terminated the parental rights of both a child’s father, because of his immigration
status, and the child’s mother, because she lived with and was financially dependent on a man
who was an illegal immigrant).
228. Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 94.
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provided by states that already make this the law for incarceration.
For example, Massachusetts provides that “[i]ncarceration in and of
229
itself shall not be grounds for termination of parental rights.”
Oklahoma’s termination of parental rights statute has similar
230
language. In a slightly different approach, Nebraska prohibits the
filing of petitions to terminate if the sole basis for the petition is that
231
the parent is incarcerated. Following the lead of these states by
adopting similar positions for deportation proceedings could address
232
the cultural bias problem for many immigrant parents.
States should also adopt laws that make illegal entry into the
country irrelevant to the fitness inquiry. At least one state court has
acknowledged that entering the United States is often undertaken for
233
the benefit of the child. By adopting such laws, legislatures would
prevent state courts from terminating a parent’s rights simply because
she took an action believed to be in the best interests of her child.
C. Adherence to and Furtherance of the Vienna Convention
Finally, to begin to solve the problem, it is necessary to ensure
that the United States complies with its obligation to provide consular
access to detained noncitizens. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention) guarantees that when a
noncitizen is “detained in any . . . manner” in another country, that
country will notify the noncitizen’s own consular post so that consular
234
officers can communicate, correspond, and visit with the noncitizen.
The consular officers may also arrange for legal representation for the
229. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(c)(xiii) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2010).
230. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-904(B)(12) (West 2009) (“[T]he incarceration of
a parent shall not in and of itself be sufficient to deprive a parent of parental rights . . . .”).
231. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-292.02(2) (LexisNexis 2005) (“A petition shall not be
filed on behalf of the state to terminate . . . parental rights . . . if the sole factual basis for the
petition is that . . . (b) the parent or parents . . . are incarcerated.”).
232. Of course, a number of states take the opposite approach and make incarceration a
factor that can demonstrate unfitness if it lasts for a certain period of time. See supra notes 194–
96. Although this is an understandable position in many cases, taking the opposite approach in
the case of deportation is not incongruent. Parents have the right to take their children with
them upon deportation, see supra note 43 and accompanying text, and in most circumstances
will be able to resume a normal, healthy relationship with the child.
233. See Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 93 (“[W]e do not conclude that Maria’s attempt to bring
herself and her child into the United States, in the belief that they would have a better life here,
shows an appreciable absence of care, concern, or judgment.” (emphasis added)).
234. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596
U.N.T.S. 261.
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235

noncitizen. The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention
236
and relies on it heavily in conducting U.S. consular activities. Two
regulations adopted prior to the ratification of the Vienna
237
Convention “fulfill the notification requirements” of Article 36.
One regulation requires that upon arresting a foreign national, the
arresting officers “inform the foreign national that his consul will be
advised of” the arrest unless the foreign national does want the consul
238
to be notified. Though this regulation applies only to foreign
239
nationals who are criminally detained, another regulation requires
that “[e]very detained alien [including those held for immigration
reasons] shall be notified that he or she may communicate with the
consular or diplomatic officers of the country of her nationality in the
240
United States.”
Rigorously adhering to the Vienna Convention could help
alleviate cultural bias against illegal immigrant parents detained for
deportation in several ways. The involvement of foreign consular
officers might cause the United States to treat the immigrant more
241
fairly and with less bias against her country of origin. The consular
authority could also bring cultural sensitivity to the process through
her knowledge of the culture from which the immigrant arrived in the
United States, knowledge of the language of the immigrant, and—
particularly relevant to child custody cases—knowledge of the
conditions in which children are raised in the immigrant’s country of

235. Id.
236. GARCIA, supra note 45, at 2.
237. Id. at 4–5.
238. 28 C.F.R. § 50.5(a)(1) (2010). If there is a treaty requiring notification, however, the
consul will be notified regardless of the detainee’s wishes. See id. (“On the other hand, some of
the treaties require notifying the consul of the arrest of a foreign national whether or not the
arrested person requests such notification.”).
239. Id. § 50.5(a). Additionally, this regulation explicitly states that it is inapplicable to
arrests made purely for noncriminal INS purposes. Id. § 50.5(b). Given that many illegal
immigrants are first arrested for a crime before being recognized as noncitizens and transferred
into immigration custody, it is possible that many would be covered by subsection (a) of the
regulation.
240. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2010).
241. See GARCIA, supra note 45, at 3 (noting that if a consular authority is involved, it
“might take diplomatic or other steps to ensure that its national is treated fairly by the receiving
State”). Presumably, involvement of the consular authority would also encourage the receiving
state to engage in diplomatic behavior to ensure appropriate treatment of the state’s own
nationals held in the sending state’s jurisdiction.
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242

origin. Finally, the consular authority could help the immigrant
navigate the U.S. justice system and attempt to ensure that the
immigrant is not treated unfairly or differently because of her
243
nationality and immigration status.
Despite the benefits of consular involvement, under the United
States’ agreement to be party to the Vienna Convention and the
244
regulations that serve to fulfill its notification requirements,
“foreign nationals are not always provided with requisite consular
245
notification information following their arrest or detention.” When
they are not notified, actual remedies, such as an injunction or
246
damages, are often not available. Changes to federal law based on
the Vienna Convention could ensure that immigrants are given
notification of consular information and remedies when notification is
not forthcoming.
First, regulations for notifications to consular authorities in cases
of immigration violations should be rephrased to mirror the more
demanding level of notification required for criminal detainees.
Federal officers are required to notify consular authorities of a
foreign national’s criminal detention, unless she requests that
247
notification not be made. Detainees held for immigration purposes,
however, are merely notified of their right to communicate with their
248
Requiring notification to the consulate of foreign
consulate.
nationals held for immigration purposes would better ensure that the
242. See, e.g., State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 83, 86 (Neb.
2009) (relying on the testimony of a Guatemalan missionary to demonstrate the safety of Ms.
Luis’s home for her children based on an understanding of Guatemalan community and
educational standards).
243. See GARCIA, supra note 45, at 3 (listing “expertise in the laws and practices of the
receiving State” and the ability to “arrange for the arrested national to receive better legal
representation than he might otherwise receive” as benefits of the involvement of consular
authorities); see also Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 97 (Gerrard, J., concurring) (“The full
participation of the consulate can help the juvenile and the juvenile’s parents by ensuring that
their interests are represented . . . .”).
244. See supra notes 237–40 and accompanying text.
245. GARCIA, supra note 45, at 5–6.
246. See id. at 6 (“[T]he State Department has historically taken the view that ‘[t]he [only]
remedies for failures of consular notification under the [Vienna Convention] are diplomatic,
political, or exist between states under international law.’” (third and fourth alterations in
original) (quoting United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 2000))); see also Maria L., 767
N.W.2d at 90 (“Other jurisdictions have concluded that state courts do not lose jurisdiction for
failing to notify the foreign consulate as required by the Vienna Convention . . . .”).
247. 28 C.F.R. § 50.5(a)(1) (2010).
248. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2010).
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consular authorities receive notification of the detention and are able
249
to provide their services to the detainee.
Second, because “no federal law or regulation has been adopted
to compel state or local law enforcement officials” to comply with the
Vienna Convention, such law and regulations should be
250
promulgated. Though there are some federalism concerns, the
federal government can nonetheless achieve compliance by state and
251
local law enforcement through the use of a federal funds act. To be
most effective in child custody and parental rights cases, such
regulations could also extend to requiring notification to consular
authorities whenever the child of an immigrant is taken into custody
252
by a state’s social services department.
Finally, for these laws to have meaningful force at the state and
local level, immigrants should have recourse in court if federal, state,
or local authorities fail to notify them of their consular rights or fail to
contact their consulate. Some courts have recognized judicial
remedies for violations of the Vienna Convention, but others have
253
not. To make Article 36 effective as a tool for eliminating cultural

249. The HELP Separated Children Act would have required the Department of Homeland
Security to ensure that detained parents of separated children are “granted regular, confidential
and in-person access to consular officials,” as well as “free, unlimited, confidential phone calls to
consular officials.” H.R. 3531, 111th Cong. § 9(c)(7) (2009).
250. GARCIA, supra note 45, at 5.
251. See id. at 21 (“Congress . . . might instead consider legislation that influences states and
localities . . . through . . . legislation conditioning federal funding for state services upon state
compliance with . . . Article 36 . . . .”). Federal funds acts are quite common in various areas of
the law, such as drinking age laws, education, and family law. Such laws are likely to be upheld.
Id.
252. At least one state has already adopted such a regulation. Nebraska law requires that
the consular authorities be notified whenever the Department of Social Services takes custody
of a foreign national minor or of a minor with dual citizenship. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 433804(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
253. Compare United States v. Banaban, 85 F. App’x 395, 396 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(determining that the Vienna Convention creates no enforceable remedy for individuals), and
United States v. Ademaj, 170 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Vienna Convention itself
prescribes no judicial remedy or other recourse for its violation . . . .”), with Standt v. City of
New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[T]he language of the [Convention],
coupled with its ‘legislative history’ and subsequent operation, suggest that Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention was intended to provide a private right of action to individuals detained by
foreign officials.”), and United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D. Mass. 1999)
(“[T]his Court finds that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention does confer an individual right to
consular notification, and that Hongla-Yamche has, therefore, standing to contest the alleged
violation of that right.”). For a description of the various positions that federal courts have
taken on the matter, see GARCIA, supra note 45, at 6 & nn.7, 29–30.
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bias, the view of the former courts should be adopted. The most
effective route would be to encourage states to codify this position in
254
their own statutes under the suggested federal funds act.
CONCLUSION
The increasing problem of illegal immigrants having their
parental rights terminated as a result of their arrest and the initiation
of deportation proceedings against them is one of the most troubling
aspects of current immigration policy. It flouts well-settled
constitutional law regarding the importance of the parent-child
relationship and the due process rights of all parents, even those who
have entered the country illegally.
This problem, likely more widespread than published cases
would suggest, exists primarily for two reasons. Cultural bias has
caused judges to avoid applying or to misapply the clear and
convincing evidence standard to questions of unfitness and to rely
heavily on biased views of what is in the best interests of the child.
This cultural bias has combined with the issues faced by prisoner
parents in preventing the termination of their parental rights to form
a perfect storm for immigrant parents.
To solve this problem, the United States should address the issue
at both the state and the federal level. Laws should reflect greater
cultural sensitivity and should diminish the opportunities for judges to
display their cultural bias. Government at all levels should comply
with international treaties that provide a culturally sensitive advocate
to immigrant parents. The federal government should reconsider the
implications of the ASFA for illegal immigrant parents, as should
states. Finally, laws regarding treatment of immigrant prisoners
should be modified so that they are no longer a barrier to parents
maintaining custody of their children. It is only with this
comprehensive approach that the United States will be able to protect
the constitutional rights of immigrants and their children.

254. See supra notes 45, 251 and accompanying text.

